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In this paper I want to adjudicate the dispute between those 
philosophers who do and those who do not think that the 
philosophy of language can illuminate metaphysical questions. To 
this end, I take the debate between Devitt and Putnam as a case 
study and diagnose what I take to be illuminating about their 
disagreement over metaphysical realism. I argue that both Putnam 
and Devitt are incorrect in their assessment of the significance of 
the model theoretic argument for realism. That, whilst Devitt is 
entitled to claim that truth does not have anything to do with 
realism, Putnam’s challenge can still gain traction and seriously 
call into question our ability to engage in realist metaphysics. I 
argue that even if a completely semantically neutral conception of 
realism can be successfully articulated, doing so has the potential 
to bankrupt the methodology of metaphysical realism. Having 
taken this debate as a case study, I then offer some brief remarks 
on how to understand the philosopher who claims that realist 
metaphysicians should care about discussions of metasemantics 
and truth. Whilst I want to be cautious about generalising on the 
basis on this case alone, I think there are important lessons to be 
learned about the way in which considerations to do with language 
can shed light on the concerns of metametaphysics. !
Keywords: Metaphysics, Metametaphysics, Reference, 
Indeterminacy, Truth, Hilary Putnam, Michael Devitt !!!
1. Introduction !
Putnam claims that his model theoretic argument “has profound 
implications for the great metaphysical dispute about realism which has 
always been the central dispute in the philosophy of language.” (Putnam  
39
*Received: 13.04.2017. 
  Accepted: 10.08.2017.
!
ARGUING ABOUT REALISM: ADJUDICATING THE 
PUTNAM-DEVITT DISPUTE* !
JADE FLETCHER 
University of Leeds, United Kingdom
Jade Fletcher
1980, 464) Putnam’s claim captures the kind of view about the 
relationship between metaphysics and language that I interrogate in this 
paper. Specifically: the view that the question of realism is not 
exclusively the remit of metaphysics, but rather is a problem in the 
philosophy of language. If this were the case, then philosophical 
problems pertaining to truth, semantics, and our systems of linguistic and 
mental representation would indeed be relevant to discussions of 
metaphysical realism. There is a tendency in some contemporary 
discussion of realism to think that this kind of view is outdated, and that 
it merely derives from a conflation of the philosophy of language and 
metaphysics. Such philosophers hold that considerations to do with 
language cannot determine or limit the enterprise of metaphysics: that 
reflecting on problems in metasemantics cannot deliver any insights 
about metaphysical realism. 
In this paper I want to progress the dispute between those philosophers 
who do and those who do not think that the philosophy of language can 
illuminate metaphysical questions. To this end, I take the debate between 
Devitt and Putnam as a case study and diagnose what I take to be 
important about their disagreement. I argue that both Putnam and Devitt 
are incorrect in their assessment of the significance of the model theoretic 
argument for realism. That, whilst Devitt is entitled to claim that truth 
does not have anything to do with realism, Putnam’s challenge can still 
gain traction and seriously call into question our ability to engage in 
realist metaphysics. I argue that even if a completely semantically neutral 
conception of realism can be successfully articulated, doing so has the 
potential to bankrupt the methodology of metaphysical realism. Having 
taken this debate as a case study, I then offer some brief remarks on how 
to understand the philosopher who claims that realist metaphysicians 
should care about discussions of metasemantics and truth. Whilst I want 
to be cautious about generalising on the basis on this case alone, I think 
there are important lessons to be learned about the way in which 
considerations to do with language can shed light on the concerns 
metametaphysics. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section two, I present Putnam’s model 
theoretic argument. I argue that the argument, if successful, is capable of 
motivating a radical metametaphysical thesis: that realist metaphysics 
cannot be sensibly pursued (§ 2). I engage with Michael Devitt’s 
criticisms of Putnam’s attack on realism. I entertain the possibility that 
Putnam’s model theoretic argument is not in good standing as his 
characterisation of metaphysical realism is incorrect. Thus, given a more 
apt characterisation of the commitments of metaphysical realism, 
Putnam’s arguments are unsuccessful in establishing the robust 
metaphysical conclusions he has in mind (§ 3). 
I then evaluate Devitt’s criticisms of Putnam along two dimensions. First, 
I briefly consider the possibility that Devitt’s own characterisation of  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realism cannot escape Putnam’s attack, as the notion of dependence that 
Devitt espouses could be understood in semantic terms (§ 3). Second, I 
argue that even if Devitt is right about the effects of the model theoretic 
argument on metaphysical realism (if this is understood as a thesis about 
the independence of what exists and that is all), there may be an equally 
dangerous threat to realism. The final section, therefore, is devoted to 
explaining this new challenge. I argue that even a metaphysics-first 
approach to metaphysics is not immune to Putnam’s argument, as even 
though the argument may not be able to motivate a rejection of realism, it 
could motivate a rejection of our realistic theorising. Therefore, the 
challenge posed by the model theoretic argument, when understood how I 
suggest, would be one which could totally undermine the notion of 
accurate representation in our theorising (§ 4). I conclude by offering 
some brief remarks what I take to be the metametaphysical and 
methodological significance of the proceeding discussion (§ 5).  1!
2. Putnam’s attack !
Putnam’s model theoretic argument aims to advance a devastating 
challenge to metaphysical realism. It aims to show that given plausible 
considerations from model theory, we are misguided in believing that our 
language can be hooked up with a mind-independent world in right way; 
where “right way” is to be understood as “the way the metaphysical 
realist purports they are hooked up”. Putnam thinks this motivates a move 
away from metaphysical realism towards his preferred ‘internal realism’.  2
Before turning to the argument itself, I need to outline how Putnam 
characterises the commitments of metaphysical realism. On his view, the 
realist is not committed to one thesis but three interrelated theses. First, a 
claim about the world: “THE WORLD” is to be characterised as 
independent, in the sense of independent of any representation of it. 
Second, a claim about language: that the reference relation for the realist 
is one of correspondence; that is, that there is a determinate reference 
relation which holds between expressions of our language and the parts 
of the world to which they refer. Third, a uniqueness thesis: that there is a 
singular correspondence between the terms of a theory and the objects 
and the properties to which they refer. (Putnam 1981, 49) 
Expressing the uniqueness thesis requires some subtlety. Putnam claims 
that there is a singular correspondence. We might think this is too strong 
a requirement and as such Putnam is overstating the realist commitments.  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There are some forms of semantic indeterminacy that do not seem, prima 
facie, to be a problem for metaphysical realism. There is a prevalent 
phenomenon of indeterminacy in natural language: vagueness. It is not 
particularly controversial to claim that natural language is vague: 
reference is not always determinant.  Paradigm terms that exhibit this 3
indeterminacy would be, ‘tall’, ‘heap’, ‘bald’, etc. Such terms admit 
borderline cases; cases where it is not clear whether the predicate applies. 
(Keefe 2000, 6) Such terms apparently lack clear extensions.  Given that 4
there are vague expressions in a language, it seems that we need to make 
sense of the reference of a term not being wholly determinant. In offering 
an explanation of this phenomenon, a semantic approach has been 
historically most popular: theorists have tried to explain this vagueness in 
terms of features of the language, and have offered a semantics and a 
logic for the suspect expressions. (Merricks 2001, 146) We might think, 
therefore, that the existence of vague predicates suggests that a one-to-
one correspondence is too committal. Consider your total theory of 
reality. Perhaps you quantify over colours. There could be two properties, 
red and red*, which the word "red" in the theory could pick out. If our 
total theory quantifies over “red”, and yet there are two equally good 
candidate referents for “red”, this might seem like enough to suggest that 
there is not a singular correspondence, but rather that there may be 
multiple equally good ones. 
I think that the realist could make two moves. First, perhaps she could 
retreat. A one-to-one correspondence is too committal, and as such the 
realist accepts that in some instances there is not a singular 
correspondence. The theory can correspond to greater and lesser degrees, 
and the realist prefers those theories which correspond more. However, 
there can still be a degree of flexibility, especially in those cases of mun-  
42
 There is a distinction between vagueness and indeterminacy. As Van Inwagan clearly 3
puts it, “Vagueness is a special case of indeterminacy—semantical indeterminacy. It may 
be indeterminate whether a sentence is true or false, indeterminate whether a term denotes 
a certain object, and indeterminate whether a given set is the extension of a certain 
predicate. I take the word ‘vague’— my universe of discourse here comprises only 
linguistic items—to be entirely appropriate only in application to predicates and certain of 
their constituents. A predicate is vague if it is indeterminate, or, at any rate, possibly 
indeterminate, which set is its extension—or if it is possible that, for at least one object, it 
is indeterminate whether that object belongs to the extension of that predicate.” (Van 
Inwagan 2009, 1)
 It is worth noting that the view that extensions are not determinant only fits with some 4
explanations of vagueness. For example, according to Williamson’s epistemicism about 
vagueness (1994), the referents of vague terms are determinant; the source of the 
vagueness is in our own ignorance.
Arguing about Realism: Adjudicating the Putnam-Devitt Dispute
-dane indeterminacy considered.  The second option is stricter. This type 5
of realist may object to the putative problem, and they will say that no 
metaphysical theory would quantify over colours simpliciter. Perhaps this 
is because they think that colours are not the types of things that belong 
in the fundamental description of reality, or perhaps it is because the 
language we use to talk about colours in metaphysics do not contain the 
predicates of everyday English but rather precisified technical predicates. 
Thus, this realist maintains the one-to-one correspondence, by eradicating 
instances of mundane indeterminacy by some means. Putnam seems to be 
levelling his argument against realists of this second variety. For our 
purposes, what is important is the thought that there should be an 
intended interpretation for our theory (allowing to the refinements 
above). The realist contention is that the intended interpretation is the one 
that matches the terms of the theory to the way the world is. 
And so, we return to Putnam’s characterisation of realism. Once we have 
these three theses, it should be clear that it is possible that we may be 
unable to represent THE WORLD at all. To put it in Putnam’s terms: 
truth is, for the metaphysical realist, radically non-epistemic. (Putnam 
1977, 485) The theory which is epistemically ideal, in the sense of 
meeting all our theoretical virtues, might still be false. Of course, it might 
be the case that ideal theory is true; the claim is not that ideal theory must 
fall short of truth. Rather the claim is that, for the realist, idealness does 
not constitute or guarantee truth. The realist must hold that there is a gap 
between ideal theory and true theory. At the heart of Putnam’s attack, 
therefore, is a distinction that realist must be committed to, but, according 
to Putnam, cannot be maintained: 
Here again, the realist – or, at least, the hard-core metaphysical 
realist – wishes it to be the case that truth and rational 
acceptability should be independent notions. He wishes it to be the 
case that what, e.g., electrons are should be distinct (and possibly 
different from) from what we believe them to be or even what we 
would believe them to be given the best experiments and the 
epistemically best theory. Once again, the realist – the hard-core 
metaphysical realist – holds that our intentions single out “the” 
model, and that our beliefs are then either true or false in “the” 
model whether we can find out their truth values or not. (Putnam 
1980, 472) 
Now, let’s turn to the argument. I should note that the model theoretic 
argument doesn’t strictly speaking pick any one thing out. Putnam 
forwards several arguments which are similar in spirit, and, whilst they  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differ in precise target and technical machinery, they all aim to forward 
the same conclusion.  Some of his discussion focuses on mathematical 6
language and employs the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem,  whereas other 7
discussion employs permutation models and focusses more on ordinary 
language.  Here, I focus on the so-called permutation argument. 8
The model-theoretic conception of a theory is one whereby there is a 
language L with a given interpretation function I, which maps the 
expressions of L onto a world of objects and properties. Putnam places 
some methodological constraints on what can fix the intended 
interpretation. First, there are what Putnam terms ‘theoretical 
constraints’. These include the standard axioms of set theory, as well as 
principles and theories from other branches of science. Second, there are 
the ‘operational constraints’. These are the various empirical observations 
and measurements that we make in the course of scientific investigation. 
There is a dual constraint on the assignment of extensions to the 
subsentential components of the sentences of the language. First, this 
must be constrained by facts about usage, understood in a suitably 
naturalistic way. I take it that by “naturalistically acceptable” Putnam 
intends to acknowledge his Quinean heritage and thus this means taking a 
somewhat behaviouristic view of the data for semantic theorising. 
Second, assignments must be constrained by getting the coarse-grained 
truth conditions of whole sentences correct.  The data which must 
constrain our semantic theorising is the semantic values of sentences, and 
the success conditions for a theory of reference are to fit this data set. 
Importantly, if there are multiple theories which both equally fit the data, 
then it is indeterminate which theory is correct. 
The argument then shows that for every theory T1, it is possible to find a 
permutation function K, such that each item in L is interpreted “in 
violently different ways, each of them compatible with the requirement 
that the truth value of each sentence in each possible world be the one 
specified”. (Putnam 1981,33) The mechanism functions as the “crazy 
assignments of reference to names can be ‘cancelled out’ by a 
compensating assignment of extensions to predicates, so that, overall, the 
truth value of sentences is unaffected.” (Williams 2007, 369) 
What we find is therefore worrying. There are multiple interpretations, all 
of which meet the requisite constraints. Although these considerations 
only apply to the set-theoretic language in question, Putnam argues that 
an argument such as this be generalised: it can apply to all languages.  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Different interpretations of a sentence can produce the same truth value at 
every possible world, but assign different extensions to the subsentential 
expressions. That is: in both the intended and permutated interpretations, 
‘cat’ is true of radically different things, but true in exactly the same 
circumstances nonetheless. Given how we defined the constraints on our 
metasemantic theorising, neither interpretation can be said to be any 
better than any other, and it is therefore indeterminate which is correct. 
This is deeply in conflict with the commitments of Putnam’s realist. 
Given the realist’s commitment to uniqueness, we would have hoped that 
there would be a single true interpretation function which takes us from 
terms of the theory to the world. However, we find that reference is 
radically indeterminate. This is not the innocuous sort of indeterminacy 
we considered at the start. It is the claim that even with all the constraints 
on reference assignment in place, and even for precise languages like 
mathematical language, reference is still indeterminate. These 
considerations put pressure on another supposed commit of realism: the 
non-epistemic nature of truth. Putnam’s realist needs it to be the case that 
there is an independence of ideal theory and truth. However, for any 
consistent theory, that theory has a model, and Putnam’s argument shows 
us that if there is one truthmaking model, then there are infinitely many 
permuted variants. The realist wants to be in a position to say that of all 
these models, one of them is getting it right and the others are getting it 
wrong. But even with all the constraints on reference assignment in place, 
they are still not able to discriminate. So, if the realist is going to persist 
in maintaining the distinction between ideal theory and truth, then they 
need to invoke some kind of magical relation. They cannot say anything 
principled about why one model is getting it right and the others are 
getting it wrong. Putnam claims that these considerations are sufficient to 
undermine the prospects for robust metaphysical realism. 
If we were to try to resist such an argument, in which direction would we 
go? Perhaps a more sophisticated theory of reference could show that we 
were wrong? Putnam claims that this cannot save our intuitive notion of 
reference as whatever additional constraint we bring in to save some 
sensible realist notion of reference, could be likewise subjected to a 
permutation.  That is: the new constraint itself needs interpretation and 9
each model will interpret it in different ways. The point of Putnam’s 
argument is that no first order theory can, by itself, determine its own 
objects up to the point of isomorphism. Putnam states the point thus: 
“The problem as to how the whole representation, including the empirical 
theory of knowledge that is a part of it, can determinately refer is not a 
problem that can be solved by developing a more and better empirical 
theory.” (Putnam 1980, 477) There are some philosophers who hold that  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the arguments for radical indeterminacy theses must not be in good 
standing as they are self-defeating. For example, Scott Soames claims 
that if the conclusions to the arguments were true, we couldn’t even state 
them. (Soames 1998, 213) There are other philosophers who have argued 
that the arguments are not in good standing as they are too stringent in 
what they allow to be taken as the constraints for providing a theory of 
reference. David Lewis, for example, argues that we need not be worried 
as some interpretations are more eligible than others and so the type of 
indeterminacy in question does not arise. (Lewis 1984, 227) 
There is of course a great deal more to be said about these responses. For 
my present purposes, however, I want to precede by assuming that 
Putnam’s argument for radical indeterminacy is in good standing; that the 
metamathematics of Putnam’s argument is correct.  I am interested in 10
working out the conditional: if an argument like Putnam’s is right, what 
can that tell us, if anything, about metaphysical realism? I now turn to 
assess a response to Putnam according to which even if we allow that 
Putnam’s conclusions about reference and truth are correct, this does not 
show us anything about the prospects for metaphysical realism. !
3. Devitt’s response !
Michael Devitt asks this question: “What does truth have to do with 
realism?” (Devitt 1983, 292) An obvious initial answer to Devitt’s 
question: it depends who you ask. First, let’s consider Putnam. Putnam 
tells us that a central commitment of metaphysical realism is that it is 
possible for ideal theory to be false: there is independence of ideal theory 
and true theory. He tells us that the notion of truth that we are interested 
in as metaphysical realists is one which matches up with reality, in an 
appropriate way. Thus, if we find out that we have a crazy metasemantics, 
then given that some of the central commitments of realism are semantic 
ones, we are in trouble. 
Devitt, however, tells us we do not need to worry. His answer to the 
question of what truth has to do with realism is “nothing at all”. (Devitt 
1983, 292) Devitt captures the notion of realism he is interested in, and 
according to him the one metaphysicians should be interested in, in terms 
of two commitments. These commitments run along two dimensions. 
First: existence. Realism commits us to a view about what exists. If I am 
a realist about some entity, or class of entities, I am committed to those 
things existing. The second commitment is trickier: “words that 
frequently occur in attempts to capture the second are ‘independent’, 
‘external’ and ‘objective’. The entities must be independent of the mental;  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they must be external to the mind; they must exist objectively in that they 
exist whatever anyone’s opinions.” (Devitt 1983, 292) 
The doctrine of realism according to Devitt should be construed thus: 
“Common sense, and scientific, physical entities objectively exist 
independent of the mental.” (Devitt 1983, 292) Construed as such, I can 
see the temptation to claim that truth does not have anything to do with 
realism. It makes no mention of semantic notions at all and it does not 
seem clear, at least prima facie, how this characterisation might implicitly 
rest on the sort of semantic commitments required to get Putnam’s attack 
going. Devitt claims that the type of indeterminacy Putnam espouses only 
has metaphysical significance if you endorse a language first approach to 
metaphysics. 
Perhaps we can view Devitt’s criticism of Putnam as a plea not to 
conflate metaphysics and the philosophy of language. It is only by 
conflating the two that one might be inclined to think that considerations 
from the philosophy of language could impact upon the realist status of 
the world. Of course, language is a tool for theorising. We do theorise 
using language, but we must not let this confuse us. The content of our 
theorising has nothing to do with language, truth or any kind of semantic 
concerns, and so we should not be alarmed by Putnam’s putative 
challenge. Metaphysics, realist metaphysics, is concerned with the world, 
not language. 
Additionally, perhaps we can see some immediate appeal to Devitt’s 
position. There is intuitive appeal; what we can and cannot say, what we 
can and cannot theorise about, should not effect what actually is the case. 
That there is a world, and that that world exists mind-independently, 
should not be effected by any concerns pertaining to model theoretic 
languages. In misrepresenting the commitments of realism Putnam gets 
away with far more than he should. Whilst we may still have cause for 
concern about the significance of Putnam style arguments in the case of 
metamathematics or metasemantics, this does not force us to any 
conclusions about the viability of metaphysical realism. Realism, so 
construed, has minimal commitments (i.e. an existence thesis and an 
independence thesis), and neither of these commitments are effected by 
the semantic concerns forwarded by Putnam. 
There are two responses to Devitt I want to consider. The first is a direct 
concern about his explicit separation of realism from any semantic 
notions. Specifically: do we need any semantic notions to make sense of 
his independence thesis? The question to ask at this stage is: exactly how 
should we understand mind-independence? This is of course a well-
rehearsed subject matter: there has been much discussion, especially in 
recent years, about dependence. But in the face of the challenge from 
Putnam, it is worth thinking about exactly what notion is at stake. 
There might be some who chose to reduce their notions of dependence to  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semantic notions, and perhaps we can see the motivation for this. 
Historically, philosophers have been very cautious about using 
metaphysically primitive notions. You find a lot of engagement with 
reductive projects which aim to analyse away the metaphysically 
primitive in favour of some more familiar notions. Rather than 
dependence being something that exists between things (in the world) 
perhaps it could better (and more parsimoniously) be characterised as a 
relationship between propositions? Analysing dependence in terms of, for 
example, the truth of propositions, we can do away with primitive 
metaphysical ideology. And perhaps we can see motivation for this: many 
metaphysicians want to think of some truths holding in virtue of some 
other truths.  But the bearers of truth are propositions, not objects. 11
However, thinking about things in this way, a concern emerges: if we 
decide to explicate dependence in such terms and place at the centre of 
our understanding of realism a claim about the relationship between true 
propositions, then Putnam’s argument can gain traction even with 
Devitt’s characterisation of realism. 
However, we can circumvent such problems by keeping dependence 
metaphysical. Exactly what would this consist in? To say that something 
exists mind independently is to say that the thing does not require the 
existence of minds for its existence. This requires some clarifications. 
First, there is a sense in which the laptop in front of me is mind 
dependent as, if it were not for the existence of minds, if human beings 
had not designed and built my laptop, it would not exist. This is not a 
metaphysically interesting sense, and not what we are concerned with 
when we are concerned with realism. Second, talk of “minds” needs 
some unpacking. Whose minds exactly? Is it my mind? Your mind? Some 
kind of collective consciousness? When talking of minds, as it concerns 
debates about dependence, we are (mostly) concerned with not just our 
actual mental lives, but rather with the mental lives of any being with a 
“finite extension of our cognitive powers”. (Jenkins 2005, 199) 
Given these two clarifications, there are still two ways we could read a 
claim of mind independence. Jenkins makes a distinction between modal 
independence and essential independence. First, we could characterise 
mind independence as a modal thesis. According to this construal, 
something is mind independent just in case, “there is a possible world 
where that thing is the case although our mental lives are not such that 
…”. (Jenkins 2005, 200) This ellipsis will be filled in differently 
depending on the nature of domain under consideration. For example, if 
we were considering moral properties, we would say that moral 
properties exist mind independently is there is a possible world at which 
moral properties are instantiated even though no minds exist at this  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world. The second option characterises mind independence as an 
essentialist thesis. According to this second sort: “p’s being the case is 
independent of our mental lives iff it is no part of what it is for p to be the 
case that our mental lives be a certain way”. (Jenkins 2005, 200) Whilst I 
do not hope to settle which of these characterisations of mind 
independence is preferable, they both provide Devitt with the requisite 
resources to disarm Putnam. Neither of these types of independence 
theses seem to immediately require any semantic notions and as such we 
might hope that the Devitt response is in good standing. 
For the purposes of argument, then, let’s suppose that Devitt’s 
characterisation of metaphysical realism is correct and not susceptible to 
criticism.  Is Putnam well and truly defeated? I think there is a larger, 12
perhaps more pressing, worry which faces realist theorising in light of 
Putnam’s attack. By way of a second response, therefore, I pursue a more 
indirect route in the next section. Perhaps we concede the point to Devitt: 
we should not take realism to consist in any commitment to a particular 
view of truth or reference, and therefore Putnam’s criticisms are inert. 
But, against what are his criticisms inert? Devitt’s rebuttal of Putnam’s 
attack on realism was supposed to preserve the world. Any considerations 
from metasemantics should have no impact on whether there is a mind 
independent existing world. Fine, we will allow this. But now we can 
perhaps reconstruct a Putnamian attack: we may have got the world, but 
can we theorise about it? !
4. Adjudicating the dispute: realism and representation !
Suppose Devitt is right. Suppose that Putnam’s arguments cannot gain 
any traction in the realism debate, as realism is concerned with the nature 
of reality, not representing reality, and that further these two concerns are 
discrete. What I want to suggest in this section is that we may be able to 
mount another challenge in the Putnamian spirit. The challenge I forward 
here accepts Devitt characterisation of realism, and, as such, holds that 
Putnam’s arguments cannot have metaphysical significance. However, I 
argue that they carry great significance for the prospect of realist 
theorising. It should be clear, therefore, that the picture I propose is not 
one that endorses any kind of anti-realism; I am not making any claims 
about what exists or the mind-independent/dependent nature of what 
exists. Rather my point is that Putnam’s arguments can generate trouble 
for any metaphysician who aims at faithful representation.  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I take it that realist theories aim at providing a representation of reality. 
The notion of representation carries with it some notion of correctness. 
We can get it right, and we can get it wrong. So, what does getting it right 
or wrong consist in; what grounds ‘getting it right’? You might think that 
getting it right merely requires truth. This still does not tell us enough. 
There are many different conceptions of truth, and not all of them are 
going to be compatible with realism. A realist theory is one that aims to 
represent reality as it is. The realist has a robust notion of representation. 
When thinking about realist representation, therefore, we want 
metaphysical perspicuity; the theory needs to be true for the right reasons. 
The elements of the theory correspond to the elements of reality that the 
theory aims to represent. 
This presentation of the requirements of successful representation seems 
compatible with the practice of realistically minded metaphysicians. Let’s 
consider two examples as a means of illustrating the point. Let’s suppose 
we are realist metaphysicians. We want to offer a metaphysical theory 
about the nature of, say, time. As a crude toy example: we have the A 
theorists and the B theorists; let’s say a presentist (who thinks that only 
the present exists) and a moving spotlight theorist (who thinks that all 
times are equally real, and the present is a matter of perspective) are 
having a discussion. The thing that they are trying to offer a theory of (i.e. 
the nature of time) is the same, irrespective of the explanation they offer. 
So, let’s say the presentist has a go first. Time is like thus and so. Then 
the moving spotlight theorist has a go. Time is like this and that. Both 
theorists, in aiming to explain and account for time, offer a representation 
of what they think that aspect of reality is like. They think it is this way, I 
assume, for good reason. They have data and arguments which urge us to 
adopt their side. But, only one of these ‘gets it right’. 
This description of theorising seems like a reasonable characterisation of 
what many realist metaphysicians seem to be doing. What appears to be a 
key notion for the metaphysical realist, is that we have a secure notion of 
accurate representation. Even if we do not want to build a view about the 
intended interpretation of a theory into the definition of realism, the 
realist metaphysician must be committed to a view about this.  If this is 13
not what they are concerned with, it seems challenging to say exactly 
what is the concern. By way of contrast, consider second toy example: an 
instrumentalist about science. Their theories do not aim to accurately 
represent the way the world is; they do not try to explain the mechanisms 
which govern natural processes. A successful theory need not say 
anything true or false about the world. Rather, they aim to provide a tool 
of prediction and as long as they have a theory which is empirically  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adequate, this is good enough. This conception of the purpose of 
theorising seems in stark contrast to the realist. 
Theorising about the world (which is what I take it is we are doing when 
we engage is realist metaphysics) is a practice of theory construction. 
This theory, as a representation of that world, has semantic properties; 
properties such as content, reference, truth conditions, truth values, etc. 
It is these semantic properties which Putnam’s argument can make 
trouble for as the model theoretic argument shows that the extension of 
the terms of the theory are radically indeterminate. 
The model theoretic argument was supposed to damage realism by 
showing that there is mass indeterminacy in interpretation. Devitt’s 
criticism of Putnam’s argument aimed to show that metaphysical realism 
is safe from any such attack, as realism is not about interpretation, it is 
about the world. What I have considered in this section is the possibility 
that realism is not so safe. If realism is understood as a thesis about what 
exists and the independence of what exists, a criticism can still be 
mounted. The same old Putnamian criticisms now attach themselves to 
the theories that the realist wants to give about what the world is like. The 
realist’s theories come out true (as all Putnam’s permuted models come 
out true), but not for the right reasons. If we wished to resist this what 
might we say? Perhaps we could argue that theorising does not require 
sematic notions. I do not see how this can get off the ground. Some 
minimal notion of accuracy in our theorising is needed, and, in as much 
as this is the case, Putnam can gain traction. I conclude this section 
therefore by noting that Devitt does not win by shifting the goal posts. 
Putnam’s argument can yet present a challenge, even if not a 
metaphysically anti-realist one. This challenge, I have argued, bankrupts 
the realist’s method for theorising about the world. !
5. Some Concluding Remarks !
Let’s take stock. The primary aim of this paper was to assess whether we 
could derive any substantial metametaphysical conclusions from 
Putnam’s argument for semantic indeterminacy. That is: if we accept the 
permutation argument, must we reject metaphysical realism? The answer 
to this question is no. If realism is understood as a claim about the nature 
of reality, then the argument is not capable of showing anything of 
metaphysical interest about reality.  However, the discussion raises a 14
different concern. The significance of Putnam’s argument for semantic 
indeterminacy arises at the level of representation. If we aim to accurately 
represent reality in our metaphysical theories, then the foregoing 
arguments seem to make this task impracticable.  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I claimed that this debate between Putnam and Devitt speaks to wider 
issues about how to understand the relationship between language and 
truth, and metaphysical realism. It would require a much longer study to 
fully taxonomise the contemporary debates pertaining to this issue, and 
that is sadly beyond the scope of this paper. Whilst I want to be cautious 
about over generalising the significance of my present discussion, I want 
to close with a brief remark on what I think is the take home message 
from the disagreement between Devitt and Putnam. 
When thinking about the relation between metametaphysics and the 
philosophy of language, I urge that we separate two different kinds of 
issues. That is: the idea of the philosophy of language as having 
methodological, if not metaphysical, import. There is a question about 
what it takes for a position to count as realist. If I claim to be a realist 
metaphysician I take it that there are two methodological presuppositions 
which are necessary for me to engage in theorising in the first place. 
First, I must think that I have some kind of access to the world. This 
could be seen as an epistemological presupposition. Second, I must think 
that I am capable of representing the world in my theories. This could be 
viewed as a metasemantic presupposition. Whatever I take the 
metaphysical characterisation of realism to be, it seems plausible that I 
must hold these two presuppositions as given if my metaphysical theories 
are to do what any realist would want them to do. I take the upshot of my 
argument against Devitt to be that there are certain kinds of arguments 
and problems in the philosophy of language that are capable of calling 
into question the legitimacy of these presuppositions. In conclusion, 
therefore, we must be careful and prudent if we want to try and dismiss 
the significance of the philosophy of language to realism. Merely 
claiming that realism is about the nature of reality and not language or 
truth is, in many cases, not sufficient to rebut attacks on realism which 
come at it from this angle. Whilst the scope of the significance of such 
attacks might not be what some philosophers have taken it to be 
historically, there is a substantial sense in which assumptions about the 
nature of truth and representation ground the enterprise of realist 
theorising. !!!!
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